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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Two maps 
 A Ming dynasty nautical map, the Selden Map of China (fig. 1) represents a world engulfed 
by a wave of changes that happened in the South China Sea (SCS) region since the arrival of 
Europeans. Its maker and origin are still mysteries waiting to be solved.  It is named after its owner 1
the English jurist John Selden, who wrote Mare Clausum (1635), which promoted the idea that the 
sea could be territorialised like land, in response to what Hugo Grotius argued in Mare Liberum 
(1609), which endorsed the notion of the sea as free for all mankind. It was bequeathed to the 
Bodleian Library in 1659, five years after Selden died.  
 Unlike other known Chinese maps, the Selden Map did not have China as its centre. Its 
heart is what we now call the SCS.  Sinologist Timothy Brook finds this a rather “strange thing for 
the cartographer to do, not just because tradition didn’t allow for it but also because there is almost 
nothing there: a hole in the centre of the map” (Brook 12). In this map, land areas are peripheral to 
the sea. And the Celestial Empire is depicted not as a dominant part but “merged” into the East and 
South East Asian region (Hongping 12).  
  Chinese scholars refer to the map as “the Dongxiyang Hanghai Tu (东西洋航海图) [Nautical Chart of the 1
Eastern and Western Seas]. For a concise discussion of the different origin stories of the map, see Hongping 
Annie Nie, The Selden Map of China: A New Understanding of the Ming Dynasty (Oxford: Bodleian 
Libraries, 2014), 17-20.
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Contrast the Selden Map with the map we now associate with that region: the SCS territorial 
claims map (fig. 2). The SCS claims map highlights how the sea is divided by the territorial 
interests of its littoral states. Though still at the centre, the sea is now a bone of contention of 
polities which, throughout most of their history, had used it as the bridge of their diverse cultures  
and economies connected by maritime trade links. 
Fig. 1. The Selden Map. From “Before Europe’s Intrusion” by Paula Findlen 
(The Nation; The Nation, 21 Jan. 2016; Web; 11 Dec. 2016) 
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The Selden Map shows a “web of sea  routes connecting China with the world” (Hongping 
54); while the claims map presents the competing territorial interests interrupted by China’s dashed 
lines, “the cow’s tongue” as Nguyen Duy Chien, vice chairman of Vietnamese National Boundary 
Commission, once put it (qtd. in Kaplan). Upon its restoration, the back of the Selden Map revealed 
“a sketch of scale, navigation points, and a diagram showing shipping routes.” Some of these routes 
include those that links Fujian, Nagasaki, Hirado, and central Vietnam; and one that links Quanzhou 
and Manila (Hongping  16). The lines in the Selden Map depicted routes connecting trade networks, 
which facilitated the economic efflorescence in this region; in the territorial claims map, they are 
like ominous lines in a palm, auguring trouble.  
 
Fig. 2. South China Sea claims map.  From “5 Things About Fishing in the South China Sea” 
by Trefor Moss  (The Wall Street Journal; The Wall Street Journal, 19 Jul. 2016; Web; 11 
Dec. 2016) 
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This transformation has a story.  A significant part of this narrative is the shift from one 
conception of space to another: from relational to territorial. These two conceptions differ in terms 
of boundary and sovereignty. In a relational conception of space, boundaries are fuzzy and fluid, 
and sovereignty can be shared; in a territorial one, boundaries are clearly demarcated, sovereignty is 
exclusive (Ringmar 12-13). The shift from a relational to a territorial conception space serves as a 
“political shock” (Goertz and Diehls, “Initiation and Termination” 32) that set into motion a series 
of processes that changed the structure of interaction of the SCS’s littoral polities, which in turn 
shaped their people’s conception of their “political being-in-space or [their] territoriality” (Larkins 
4). Just like any political shock, this conceptual shift has consequences; and this endeavour tells the 
story of how it is consequential to the rivalry of the sea’s littoral states. 
By focusing on the bilateral relations of two SCS claimants — China and the Philippines — 
this thesis will show how the transformation in the conception of political space from a relational to 
a territorial one is consequential to the development of their rivalry over a sea they have shared for 
the most part of their bilateral history.  This undertaking departs from materialist explanations of the 
conflict by foregrounding the role of ideas in precipitating and structuring the logic of the disputes. 
To accomplish this goal, the following questions will be addressed: What is the difference between 
relational and territorial conceptions of space? How each manifested in the interaction of China and 
the Philippines?  When did the shift from a relational to a territorial conception of space happened 
in the SCS region? What events prodded this shift and what are the ideas they engendered that 
midwifed the territorial conception of space? And how did this shift generated the rivalry between 
China and the Philippines? 
After this introduction, there will be six chapters. Consisting of three sections, Chapter 2 
will present a review of the literature on the SCS conflict. The first deals with the three major 
approaches scholars used to discuss the SCS tussle; the second highlights the preponderance of 
materialist explanations and the scarcity of explorations on the role of ideas in fostering the conflict; 
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and the last one focuses on the three major changes implicated as the cause of the conflict. It ends 
with a brief explanation of how this study will fill in the gap in the literature.  
Chapter 3 begins by presenting the two theoretical frameworks this paper will use to 
structure the story it seeks to tell: the rivalry approach to conflict and constructivist theory of 
international relations. Fusing them into one analytical framework, this study will substantiate how 
the rivalry of China and the Philippines has been shaped by the transformation in their 
intersubjective understanding of space, which consequently shaped the way the saw themselves and 
influenced how they relate with each other. This chapter ends with a brief note on the methodology 
suited for the aim and theoretical framework of this study. Chapter 4 will then recreate the two 
different structures of interaction within which China and the Philippines played out their relations 
throughout their bilateral history. 
In chapter 5, the major historical events that provoked the shift from a relational conception 
of space to a territorial one will be discussed. It will be followed by an unpacking of the 
intersubjective and institutionalised forms of ideas they engendered. Following that is an 
explanation of how these changes shaped the perception of China and the Philippines of each other 
as rivals, which consequently led to their rivalrous relationship over the SCS.  This paper ends at 
chapter 6, with a summary and a reflection on how this paper is not just a scholarly contribution but 
a political intervention to the conflict between China and the Philippines. 
Guided by the realist and liberal approaches to international relations, pundits and 
policymakers mulling over the SCS conflict often look at “the material notions of power” and “the 
role played by rationalist conceptions of geopolitical necessity” (Kupchan 19). Furthermore, they 
are stuck in what Agnew (1994) called the “territorial trap,” which is the tendency to take for 
granted the historical specificity of nation-states. Corollary to this is to take the territorial 
conception of space as an unproblematic given. If the SCS territorial conflict is a game, these 
pundits and policymakers look at the rivalry of its players in terms of their interests, power, and 
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strategies as they assert their spatial claims. This overlooks the aspects of the game which constitute 
the intersubjective understandings of the players, i.e. the facets structuring the logic of the rivalry. 
Focusing on the process of rivalry development, with its constructivist stance, this thesis unravels 
the structuring logic of the rivalry between China and the Philippines. And through this unravelling, 
it is hoped that imaginative insights might be kindled in the minds of policymakers seeking to 
transform the relationship of China and the Philippines, and perhaps the rest of the  littoral states of 
the SCS, from rivalry to cooperation.
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CHAPTER 2 
Charting the SCS conflict 
 This chapter presents a review of the literature on the SCS conflict. Composed of three 
sections, the first discusses the three major approaches used to tackle the SCS disputes: nationalist, 
international law, and international system approaches. The second examines how the discussions 
on the SCS conflict seem to disregard the role of ideas in precipitating the disputes. The third zeroes 
in on the three major shifts scholars identified as consequential to the conflict. The chapter ends 
with a brief explanation of how this paper intends to fill in the gap in the SCS literature. 
Three approaches                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 Just like any conflict, the SCS row can be viewed from different angles, using divergent 
theoretical lenses, parsed at different levels of analysis. Tønnesson (2002) clusters the major 
approaches to the disputes into three broad categories: nationalist, international law, and 
international system approaches (571). The nationalist approach looks at the conflict through the 
perspectives, interests, and aspirations of the SCS claimants. The international law perspective 
approaches the conflict by weighing the merits of the each claim against international law (570).  
Nonetheless, even if they reference international law, a supposedly transnational tool, true to realist 
understanding of international relations,  SCS claimants interpret the law according to their 2
 See Goldsmith and Posner.2
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interests. Lastly, the international system approach seeks to uncover the dynamics in the 
international system that precipitated the conflict. 
 A brief survey of the nationalist perspectives on the conflict reveals that China and 
Vietnam’s claims sing the same tune. Since 1949, China’s position remained the same, save for 
some minor changes “gradually clarified and strengthened by national legislation and official 
documents” (Bing Bing and Talmon 4). The most clarifying statements China has released about 
their claims are China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands (1980); the 
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (2014); and the 
Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty 
and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (2016). The first one presented the 
historical basis of China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the Spratly’s and Paracel’s; the second is 
China’s response to the arbitration case the Philippines filed in the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in The Hague; and the last succinctly declares China’s claims and their bases, again emphasising 
history. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s claims “are set out in a White Paper published by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1974.” Echoing the structure of China’s claims,  Vietnam claims 
“sovereignty over all of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes based on 
several factors, including historical evidence, economic development, effective administration, and 
international recognition” (Pedroza 37).  The Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei mainly base their 
claims on international law, marshalling the concepts of continental shelf and Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ).   3
For the international law approach, Valencia, van Dyke and Ludwig (1997) offers a concise 
analysis of the SCS claims of the parties to the disputes under international law (17-76). They opine 
that all of the claimants “made a claim that has significant weaknesses under international law, and 
  See The Asia Center; Roach.3
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it is highly unlikely that any of the claimants would receive all of its claimed areas in an 
adjudication by the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal” (59-60). The apogee of the 
international law approach to the conflict is the decision on the arbitration case filed by the 
Philippines against China (see The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China; 
also see Bing Bing and Talmon).  Compared to the legal approach to the conflict, the international 4
system approach is scarce.   
Material vs ideational explanations 
 Discussions on the SCS conflict also seem to be dominated by the role of both living (e.g. 
fish) and non-living resources (e.g. minerals) in fomenting the disputes. For example, O’Brien 
(1977), Buzynski (2012), and Herberg (2016) talk about the role of mineral resources. Bartley 
(2016), Greer (2016) and Malasig (2016) see the disputes as primarily driven by the growing 
scarcity of fish in the sea. Meanwhile, he arbitration case filed by the Philippines revolves around 
issues of sovereign rights over particular areas of sea.  These are all materialist explanations of the 
conflict. 
 The role of ideas, especially the concept of territory, is often treated as an unproblematic 
given. In this perspective, the SCS conflict is about the desire for acquiring or, in Chinese and 
Vietnamese governments perspectives, exerting control over a territory that originally belongs to 
them, rather than about how the very notion of territory itself is the cause of the problem. 
Perspectives pinpointing the role of the notion of territory itself as consequential to the SCS conflict 
 Oxford Public International Law provides an excellent starting point in navigating the legal aspect of the South China 4
Sea conflict. See “Debate Map: Disputes in the South and East China Seas,” Oxford Public International Law, http://
opil.ouplaw.com/page/222/debate-map-disputes-in-the-south-and-east-china-seas#maritimeboundarysouth/, 12 
November 2016. The Peace Palace Library has a collection specially dedicated to the South China Sea Territorial 
Disputes, see https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/library-special/south-china-sea-territorial-disputes/, 12 November 
2016. 
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might be scarce because, as Elden (2013) puts it in his pioneering historical study of the idea of 
territory,  
it is generally assumed that territory is self-evident in meaning, and that its 
particular manifestations — territorial disputes, the territory of specific 
countries, etc. — can be studied without theoretical reflection on territory 
itself. Although it is a central term within political theory, geography, and 
international relations, the concept of territory has been underexamined (3). 
(italics by the author). 
Since the concept of territory is considered a given, it is neglected as a crucial factor in 
precipitating conflicts. However, conflict over territory presupposes the existence not just of the 
material component of the concept (i.e. space). As Gottman (1975) puts it, “it would be illusory to 
consider territory as a gift of God and as a purely physical phenomenon…Territory is a concept 
generated by people organizing space for their own aims” (29). Thus, territory is space plus the 
institutionalised idea about it, created by people in pursuit of particular aims, which in turn shapes 
what actors do to space.  
Unfortunately, even the three major subsequent narratives on the SCS conflict that will be 
parsed shortly do not pay much attention to how the concept of territory itself led to the SCS tussle. 
The sea as a space has always existed, but the ideas that turned it into an apple of discord has a 
history. 
The shifts that led to the SCS conflict 
The conflict has been associated with three different factors that shifted. First, the changing 
maritime role and policies of China; second, the shifting balance of power in the region, which 
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serves as the major reason behind the intractability of the conflict; and third, the transformation in 
the inter-polity system of this region. 
 China’s changing maritime role and policies has been implicated as the “sine qua non” of 
the conflict (Samuels xvii). Other possible causal variables pale in comparison to China’s attributes. 
The abundant resources and strategic value of the islands and waters of the SCS are relegated into 
mere “incentives” of the various claims (4). Meanwhile, the novel notion of “territorial or spatial 
sovereignty” is cast as a “new instrument of defense” China used in order to assert its maritime 
interests (47).  In this narrative, China’s changing roles and policies “conditions the meaning of the 
contest” (150) and serve as the “most fundamental context of the continuing dispute over the islands 
and waters of the South China Sea” (7). 
 This Sino-centric analysis unravels by first determining the major player of the game then 
proceeds to crediting that player as the origin of the game and how it is played. Other claimants are 
players of the SCS contest but not its consequential players. China is identified not just the 
consequential player, but also the constitutive actor in the conflict. This ignores the attributes of the 
game itself that actually constitutes the players and whose rules shape how the players play. 
 By focusing on one player, this narrative offers no explanation on why and how the rivalry 
among the parties to the conflict come about. It is more a story of China’s presence, use, and claim-
making than a causal explanation of the existence of the rivalry itself. At best, what can be inferred 
from this is that China’s changing maritime role and policies affect the intensity of the rivalry rather 
than serve as the sine qua non of the rivalry. China is a significant party but not the cause of the 
SCS rivalry itself. 
 Departing from the previous Sino-centric approach, eschewing nationalist and legal 
approaches, another narrative appraises the conflict in light of the balance of power shifts in the 
SCS (Tønnesson  570-601). It proceeds by first unpicking the features of the international system in 
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different historical turning points in this region, and then proceeds to evaluate the balance of power 
in those periods.  
 However, this narrative is not about the cause of the conflict per se but about the cause(s) of 
the intractability of the conflict. It implicates four factors: 1) the complexity of the conflict; 2) oil; 
3) stickiness of the Taiwan issue; and 4) lack of intervention of the “dominant power,” i.e. the 
United States (595). The last one is the reason associated with the key variable: balance of power: 
“When the dominant power stays out of a dispute the prospect of resolving it is normally 
reduced” (596). This though is assumed rather than explained. Conspicuously absent is a theory of 
how the balance of power and changes in its configuration can lead to the de-escalation of the 
conflict. Without this theoretical framework, it is hard to understand the causal effect of balance of 
power to the SCS conflict. And as the recent turn of events has shown, contrary to its claim, the 
involvement of the United States has not de-escalated but further increased the tensions in the SCS 
(for instance see Benner; Mansour; Xue and Xu). Further weakening the claim that US involvement 
can pacify the situation, preliminary studies have shown that intervention of third parties to 
territorial conflicts “has not indicated…much success in achieving [territorial settlement] or 
significantly altering the dynamics of rivalries” (Stinnett and Diehl 737). 
 Nonetheless, despite its shortcomings, this narrative still offers insights on some of the key 
changes that shaped the rivalry: materialisation of the concept of territorial sovereignty during the 
colonial period, proliferation of states during decolonisation, emergence of the 200 nautical mile 
EEZs, and nationalism. These changes, however, are treated as separate events rather than as 
sequence of processes constituting the structural change that generated the conflict. This structural 
change has been touched upon by the next narrative in passing. 
 The third narrative identifies system’s change as the foundation of the SCS conflict, which it 
limns as the shift “from fluid frontier to fixed frontline” (Hayton  47). Implicated in this narrative 
are the colonial powers which served as a major driving force of change in this region: “They 
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created the states and they created the borders between them, from which the maritime frontiers 
were measured.” The territorial agreements of colonial powers were “part of a much wider process 
of defining and marking borders…, a process that generated great resentment and resistance” (49).  
Through this process, South East Asia’s international system has shifted from the “mandala 
system,” composed of political units of fluid boundaries and “vague” maritime boundaries, into a 
Westphalian system of fixed boundaries (Hayton  46-50). This in turn “spawned a rush for territory 
in the South China Sea” (Hayton  60). Though this narrative has identified the structural changed 
that happened, it has not traced the causal mechanism linking the systemic shift identified with the 
rivalry it engendered. 
Furthermore, the way this narrative uses mandala excludes China from that system.  The 
way “South East Asia” has been used is also ahistorical: South East Asia, as a region, is a 20th 
century invention. As Emmerson (1984) unpacks the term, South East Asia is the “resulting zone” 
in the perceptions of Westerners who used “mammoth” landmarks to identify these group of polities 
lying east of India and south of China. Later on, the term assumed an institutional form when 
South-East Asia Treaty Organization was formed; it is an organisation spearheaded by the United 
States as a way of containing the spread of communism (1-21).  Thus, South East Asia is a region 
carved during and not before the transformation of this region’s inter-polity system into a 
Westphalian system. Whether this exclusion of China existed during the mandala system needs to 
be further explored. 
 Nonetheless, despite its weaknesses, the third narrative still inspires this paper. This study 
will build and improve upon that narrative by identifying the factors it did not mention and by 
making explicit the causal mechanisms that link changes in  the structure of interaction between the 
political units of the countries we now call the Philippines and China and their current rivalry. Just 
like the second narrative, this paper will conduct its analysis at the international level. Unlike the 
first narrative, this study will not relegate territorial sovereignty into a mere instrument of defence 
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but a key element in the new spatial order that emerged in the SCS region. The changes the second 
narrative recognised, especially the materialisation of the concept of territorial sovereignty during 
colonial period and the emergence of the 200 nautical mile EEZs will not be considered as disparate 
processes but will be conceived as “sequences of occurrences that result in transformations of 
structures” (Sewell 843). To realise the task of this paper, the fusion of two theoretical frameworks 
and a methodology will be used, which the next chapter will discuss. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
The story this paper seeks to tell is guided by two theoretical frameworks: the rivalry 
approach to conflict and constructivist theory of international relations.  Through their fusion, this 
study will substantiate how the rivalry of China and the Philippines has been shaped by a new 
intersubjective understanding of space which consequently shaped the way they perceived each 
other. After discussing how these two theoretical perspectives could be merged into one analytical 
framework, this chapter ends with a brief note on the methodology suited for the aim and theoretical 
framework of this study. 
Rivalry approach to conflict 
 The rivalry approach to conflict treats war and disputes as related to each other and not as 
separate events. Accordingly, wars and conflicts do not just occur between any pair of states that 
have an adversarial relationship but only among states who are rivals (Lie 259-260).  In 
international relations, rivalry is a type of interstate relationship among “pairs of states whose 
leaders see each other as threatening.” Because of this, the interaction between these states typically 
involves “serious and repeated conflicts and disputes with each other” (Cashman 252).  
 Clash of interests, threat perception, and duration are three elements that must be present in 
order for an adversarial interstate relations to be considered a rivalry. As Hensel (1996) puts it, 
  /SASOT - Master’s Thesis16
“rivals are…actors whose relations are characterised by disagreement or competition over some 
stakes that are viewed as important, where each perceives that the other poses a significant security 
threat, and where this competition and threat perception last for substantial periods of time” (5). 
Thus, the rivalry approach to conflict identifies the presence of competition and mutual threat 
perception over a period of time as pre-conditions for an interaction among states to be called a 
rivalry, which has the potential to erupt into an armed contest. 
 Rivalry has been operationalised in two general ways: enduring rivalry, which is also called 
dispute density approach, and strategic rivalry approach. Diehl and Geortz’s (2001) enduring rivalry 
approach operationalises rivalry as a militarised relationship over a particular period of time. 
Specifically, they have identified rivals as those states whose competition over an issue “involves 
six or more militarized disputes between the same two sates over a period of 20 years” (Diehl and 
Geortz, “Initiation and Termination” 33).  
 Meanwhile, the strategic rivalry approach does not have militarised disputes and duration as 
prerequisites to consider states as rivals. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2008) are the main 
proponents of this approach, which considers the mutual threat perceptions of the leaders of states 
that have incompatible goals as the precondition for an interstate relationship to be considered a 
rivalry. Researchers following this approach, “examines leaders’ perceptions of other states to 
determine which dyads of states are rivals” (Hensel 23).  
 Between the two approaches, this paper follows the strategic rivalry tradition. Table 1 
summarises (see Appendix) the interactions between the Philippines and China (as ROC and later as 
PRC). Strategic rivalries are classified as “being either spatial (where the main disputes are over 
control of territory), positional (over relative influence and status within the international system or 
a regional subsystem), or ideological” (Cashman 252-253). The rivalry between China and the 
Philippines is spatial. As can be gleaned from the Table 1.1, it started the moment the Philippines 
officially joined the contest for the Spratly Islands in 1970’s, when Philippine president Ferdinand 
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Marcos appropriated the private claims of Tomas Cloma. Since then, the leaders of both nations 
have viewed each other as threats to each other’s interests.  
 As important as identifying states as rivals is explaining how their rivalry come about.  
Stinett and Diehl (2001) identify two pathways to rivalry development: behavioural and structural.  
The behavioural approach posits that “long-term rivalries develop because the actors’ behaviour in a 
given confrontation sets the stage for subsequent confrontations” (719). If in the nascent stage of 
their disputes adversarial states employ military rather than diplomatic means, that adversarial 
relationship would escalate into an enduring rivalry. This is because hard power means “create an 
atmosphere of distrust and hostility than can culminate in an extended rivalry” (719). On the other 
hand, the structural approach posits that a “rivalry relationship is determined largely by structural 
factors, such as the issues underpinning the conflict, basic characteristics of the states involved, or 
systemic attributes” (722). Inspired by the punctuated equilibrium model of biology and policy 
development, Goertz and Diehls (1995) argue that “political shock” is the “necessary condition” for 
the “initiation and termination of an enduring rivalry.” These shocks are “dramatic changes” that 
reconfigure the context of the interaction of the actors. Without these shocks, the relationship of the 
actors “will remain stable over time,” i.e. either they remain rivals or friends (Goertz and Diehls, 
“Initiation and Termination” 32).  They identify two general types of shocks: system and state 
shocks. Some examples of system level shocks are “…world wars, dramatic changes in territorial 
sovereignty, and rapid shifts in power distribution.” State level shocks include “independence and 
civil war” (Goertz and Diehls, “Initiation and Termination” 35-58).  
  In their empirical analysis of 1,177 militarised dispute from 1816-1992, Stinnett and Diehl 
find that neither approach holds the monopoly on explaining rivalry development. As they put it, 
“whether a rivalry becomes enduring or not is a function of the behaviour of the actors during early 
confrontations and the contextual factors surrounding those interactions” (736). As shown in Table 
1, China and the Philippines have both utilised military means in the early stages of their territorial 
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conflict. This serves as a fodder to the behavioural explanation of the rivalry development between 
these two countries. However, this paper is not going to employ the behavioural approach; it is 
going to be guided by the structural approach to rivalry development. This is because this approach 
to rivalry development, just like strategic rivalry tradition, allow a “more rigorous understanding of 
the rivalry” as they both examine rivalries as “outcomes of broader historical processes” (265). 
Constructivist theory of international relations 
 The constructivist theory of international relations emphasises the constitutive effects of 
ideas and social structure to how state interests develop (Wendt, Social Theory). Accordingly, 
interests are not “independent of social context.” Interests are constituted by the identity of the 
states  (such as friend, rival, enemy) that gets formed in the process of interacting with each other 
(Wendt, “Anarchy” 398-399). 
 However, these identities are not pre-given. They get constituted by the structure of their 
interaction which are “determined primarily by shared ideas” (Wendt, Social Theory 1), which 
actors learn – and unlearn – through “an on-going process of socialization and ritual 
enactment” (Wendt, Social Theory 163). It is through the process of socialization actors acquire 
“identities and interests” by interacting through exogenously given structures (Wendt, Social Theory 
170, 245) 
Shifts in the structure of interaction produce a change in identity and interests. Wendt 
illustrates this using the games Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken. The “sub-optimal” (both players 
will defect)  and “unintended” outcome of the game is “forced on [the players] by the structure” of 
the game itself. If the structuring logic of the game changes, then the game could become Chicken 
instead of Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Wendt, Social Theory 148-149). 
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 To sum up, constructivist theory of international relations emphasises that the structure of 
interaction of states prefigures their identity as either rivals, enemies, or friends, which in turn 
precedes their interests. 
The analytical framework 
 The rivalry approach to conflict aids in conceptualising the relationship between China and 
the Philippines as a rivalry, which developed because of structural causes. However,  the structural 
approach to rivalry development mostly accounts for materialist causes such as polarity of the 
international system, geographic proximity, military capabilities, and wealth (Stinnett and Diehl 
722-727). Since this study aims to depart from materialist explanations of the SCS conflict, 
constructivism is the theoretical lens suited for this purpose.  Constructivism is an alternative to 
materialist approach to international relations because it focuses on “the ideas that give shape to 
international politics…[which] are intersubjective (that is, shared among people) and 
institutionalized (that is expressed as practices and identities)” (Hurd 301).
Figure 3 shows how the two theoretical lenses could be fused into one analytical framework 
for the purpose of this thesis. Constructivism allows us to theorise the causal mechanism that 
connects system-level political shocks to interstate rivalry (rival theory of conflict). The causal 
mechanism is the process of socialisation. The system-level political shock, in the form of shift in 
the structure of interaction of states, triggers changes in intersubjective and institutionalised forms 
of  ideas, which in turn changes the way states perceive themselves, which consequently shapes the 
way they conduct their relations with each other. Through the constant interaction of the parties 
involved, the changes precipitated by transformations in the structure of their interaction gets more 
and more entrenched, i.e. the intersubjective and institutionalised forms of ideas and states’  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perception of each other gets reinforced. “Structural reproduction,” as Wendt puts it, “is caused by a 
continuous process of interaction that has reproduction as its intended or unintended consequence” ( 
Social Theory 186). Through this process of socialisation, states learn to perceive each other as 
either enemies, rivals, or friends. Through constant iteration of this mutual perception of each other 
as rivals in a structure of interaction generated by the initial political shock (as illustrated by the 
feedback loop), a rivalrous relationship between the states ensues and persists, until another 
political shock transforms the structure of their interaction, as the rivalry theory of conflict predicts.
Fig. 3. Fusion of rivalry approach to conflict and constructivist theory of international relations
system-level 
political shock
(shift in structure of 
interaction)
changes in intersubjective 
and institutional forms of 
ideas
changes in the way one views 
one’s self and in the conduct 
of relations with others
identity formation
(e.g. enemy, rival, friend) inter-state rivalry
Socialisation 
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Methodology 
 Since this thesis will unravel causal mechanisms, process tracing is the methodology suited 
for this purpose, specifically theory-testing process tracing. Beach and Pedersen (2013) explain that 
this type of process tracing is appropriate when the researcher knows “both X and Y” and ‘either 
have existing conjectures about a plausible mechanism” or can just use “logical reasoning to 
formulate the casual mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 14). This type of process tracing is 
appropriate for this study because it 1) has identified both X (system-level political shock) and the 
Y (rivalry between China and the Philippines); and 2) has a theory-supported conjecture on the 
tenable casual mechanism (constructivist theory of international relations). 
 As this study focus on the role of  non-material factors (e.g. beliefs, norms, idea) in 
generating the rivalry, along with the deductive technique of theory-testing process tracing, the 
process tracing used in this study is not only theory-testing it is also interpretive. 
  Interpretive process tracing (IPT) is a form of  process tracing that explains outcomes by 
studying “intersubjective social institutions as part of causal processes” (Norman 4-5). Using a 
combination of interpretive and inductive techniques,  IPT “situates meaning making and identity 
formation in the context of processes that unfold over time to explain how these social dynamics 
produce specific outcomes” (Norman 6). 
 To begin the process, the next chapter will first recreate the two different structures of 
interaction within which China and the Philippines played out their bilateral relations throughout 
their history. 
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Chapter 4 
The structures of interaction between China and the Philippines 
To understand what has transformed, this chapter will discuss the two structures of 
interaction within which China and the Philippines played out their bilateral history. It begins by 
comparing the two modes of thinking about space: relational and territorial. Afterwards, there will 
be an explanation on how these concepts are expressed at the unit level and through the bilateral 
interaction of China and the Philippines.  
Relational vs territorial conception of space 
All throughout their bilateral history, the interaction between China and the Philippines has 
been structured by two different conceptualisations of political space: relational and territorial. 
Ringmar (2012) differentiates the two along the following aspects: border and sovereignty (13).  
 In a relational conception of space, borders are fluid and not clearly demarcated. They are 
transitional zones rather than either/or lines. Authority is “founded on personal allegiance…rather 
than on a precise territorial base” (El Ouali 89).  Sovereignty is “not a binary notion and land can 
have several masters or no master at all” (Ringmar 13). It is thus possible to share sovereignty, as 
one can also have multiple personal allegiances. 
 On the other hand, in a territorial conception of space, borders are clearly demarcated by 
lines, which are extended into the sea. Authority is exercised within these clearly delineated 
borders, which tidily separates “the complete authority of one state from the similarly complete 
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authority of its neighboring states” (Branch, The Cartographic State, 21). Sovereignty cannot be 
shared:  “Each state either has complete sovereignty over a certain piece of land or not at 
all” (Ringmar 13).    
These two conceptualisations of space have manifested during different moments in the 
history of China and the Philippines, which in turn shaped their bilateral interaction in 
fundamentally different ways. 
China and the Philippines and the relational conception of space 
China: Part of a whole 
 Throughout its dynastic periods, China’s relations with other polities was influenced by the 
idea of Tianxia ( 天下).  Roughly translated as “All-under-Heaven,” tianxia envisions the world as a 
single unit, with China as its centre. Inclusion is “one of its  most important principles” (Zhao 10).  
Everyone has a place in this tianxia, where Chinese rulers play the role of “the Son of Heaven,” 
who exerts universal authority (Zhang 571). This universal authority is deemed to be like “universal 
parenthood,” through which the sovereign figure “rules the world only when he assumes parental 
responsibilities for his subjects” (Chen 649).  And since tianxia conceptualises the world as a single 
unit, clear demarcation of inter-polity borders did not concern China in most of its history (Carlson 
41). After all, as Dijkink argues, such claims to universal authority is “clearly inconsistent with the 
practical aim of territorial delineation” (4). Having those boundaries would diminish the all-
encompassing character of universal authority.    
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 By conducting “tributary relations”  with other polities, Chinese rulers legitimise and 5
“demonstrate their status as the Son of Heaven” (Zhang 571). This foreign relations mechanism 
began during the Chin and Han dynasties. The Tang dynasty expanded it. It flourished during the 
Song and Yuan periods, reached its zenith in the Ming period; while the Qing dynasty saw its 
decline ( Wu 6). The exchanges that happened through these tributary relations with “China as the 
center of the world and the peripheries of other countries [were] defined in terms of the son of 
heaven’s obligations to pay greater gifts to the tribal chieftains, who were, in turn, the ‘sons’ of their 
emperor ‘father’’” (Wang 364). 
Tributary visits of foreign visitors were governed by an elaborate ritual. Paying tributes and 
performing the kotou were part of this ritual. During the kotou, delegates of the tributary mission 
kneel three times and prostrate nine times before an emperor seated on “a throne placed on an 
elevated platform…” The ritual performed during tributary visits was the way for foreigners to 
acknowledge “the cultural supremacy of China” and to express their gratitude “to the emperor for 
his role in maintaining the cosmic order.” (Ringmar 9-10). In return, the emperor recognised the 
legitimacy of the rulership of the foreign leaders. It is important to note that the polities headed by 
these leaders “did not become colonies or part of the imperial administrative system: they were 
simply enrolled as independent states now occupying their proper niche in the Chinese cosmic 
order” (Scott 3). Thus, though the Chinese ruler viewed himself as ruling at the centre of tianxia, he 
“did not claim sovereignty over [the] system as a whole…[T]he constituent units were free to carry 
on their affairs much as they please” (Ringmar 5). 
 According to Zhang (2009), “the term ‘tribute system’ is a western invention devised no later than the 5
nineteenth century and translated back into Chinese as chaogong tixi…The terms chao and gong do appear in 
Chinese historical sources, but the Chinese had no conception of it as such. The tribute system is a modern 
intellectual construct that we refine or abandon that we refine or abandon, depending on the intellectual 
payoffs that can be generated. The important point is that one can talk about tributary relations without 
feeling simultaneously obliged to stick to the tribute system” (574). 
  /SASOT - Master’s Thesis25
  Through these tributary relations, China also established trade relations. However, these 
trade relations ran parallel to and in contrast with maritime trade conducted by private Chinese 
merchants. As An (2009) describes it, the tributary relations “manifested official, legitimate and 
monopoly trade from above, while maritime private trade represented…direct business transactions 
from below” (10). 
The Philippines: Kinship
 Throughout most of its history, the Philippines is not a single unit but composed of what can 
be called independent kinship networks, chiefdoms, rajahnates, and sultanates. The exact names for 
these political entities are hard to ascertain as the terms for them “either did not exist or have not 
survived” (Woods 34). However, as Woods argues, these political entities most probably share the 
same features of the political organisations of other Southeast Asian pre-nation-state societies (34). 
Nonetheless, ethnographic studies of indigenous communities in the Philippines still offers a 
glimpse into pre-nation-state political practices. 
 Walters (1990) uses mandala as a conceptual tool to describe these societies. A Sanskrit 
word, which literally means circle, mandala “represented a particular and often unstable political 
situation in a vaguely geographical area without fixed boundaries” (28). A mandala “always 
remained personal and impermanent; it was not a mapped territorial unit” (114).   
 Woods considers the concept of bayan in Tagalog societies as a close associate of mandala. 
As fluid and relational as mandala, bayan  was the basic organization of Tagalog societies. As 6
described by a Franciscan friar Juan de Plascencia: ruled by a chief called datu, a bayan   was 7
composed of  as many as a hundred households. Each bayan is “a family of parents and children, 
 Woods (2008) diverges from the popularly held notion that barangay,  a “Spanish corruption  version of the 6
Tagalog balangay”  was the basic political organization of Tagalog societies. He refutes this by  reexamining 
early Spanish accounts of Tagalog societies and highlighting documents produced by Tagalog speakers 
during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines (30-54). 
 Plascencia used “barangay” instead of bayan. But convinced of the analysis of Woods, I will use bayan.7
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relations, and slaves. There were many of these [bayan] in each town…They were not, however, 
subject to one another, except in friendship and relationship” (qtd. in Woods 31). 
 Kinship is an important principle in forming relations with another community. As Andaya 
puts it, it is “the binding medium in the creation of bonds between communities…, usually 
formalized by a ceremony whereby two leaders accepted each other as brothers” (407). Blood oath 
was the ritual through which this bond was established. The ritual involved “a ceremony in which 
drops of blood from the persons entering into this relationship were mixed in an alcoholic drink, 
which they then drank” (Aguilar 85).  This oath does not prevent the parties to perform it with 
others. They just establish mutual obligation, cements “alliances among rulers or chiefs and their 
followers” or ends a feud. The Tausug of Jolo called this blood brotherhood, bagay 
magtaymañghud. It is either a ritual friendship sworn on the Koran between two “casual friends 
[who decided] to cement their relationship with supernatural sanctions” or between two adversaries 
who would like “to finalize an amicable settlement between them”  (Kiefer 228). Blood oaths   
“transform the most distant stranger into a kinsman [as] suggested in an early Spanish account of 
the Philippines” (Andaya 408).  The most famous blood oaths between foreigners and natives were 
between Ferdinand Magellan of Portugal and Rajah Humabon of Cebu; and  Miguel Lopez de 
Legazpi and Datu Sikatuna of Bohol. 
 Even trade relationships could be expressed in terms of kinship. Take for example how the 
Teduray and Maguindanaoan forge their trade relations. The Teduray people live in the uplands of 
Cotabato in Mindanao, while the Maguindanaon people live in the lowlands. To establish trade 
pacts, the Teduray kefeduwan (legal authority) and Maguindanaon datu would perform a ritual 
called “seketas teel or “cutting rattan together” (Schlegel 6) . The ritual is described as follows 8
The kefeduwan and datu 
 Thanks to Schlegel for sending me a copy of his paper.8
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would each take hold of the end of a strip of a rattan and, laying the rattan 
upon a log, would chop it into two with a kris, while swearing to be ‘as 
brothers’ –- to treat each other henceforth not as hostile but, for purposes of 
trade, as being ‘of one father, one mother’(6). 
China and the Philippines in a ‘Single Ocean’
 Interactions between China and polities that are now part of the Philippines have been 
recorded as early as the Sung dynasty (960 - 1279).  These interactions have existed at two levels: 
private trade and official tributary missions.  
 The earliest recorded contact between Chinese and inhabitants of the Philippines “took place 
when traders from Mai-i (now Mindoro, a major island in Luzon) went to Canton in the tenth 
century through the Champa (Vietnam coast). In 982, the Mai-i traders went directly to Canton for 
the first time” (Dagdag 32). Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro annually celebrates the history of this 
trade relations every last week of April through their Sanduguan Festival. According to oral history, 
the Mangyans, indigenous inhabitants of Mindoro, “taught the Chinese native games, while the 
foreigners performed the lion dances and plays.” This festival also serves as a reminder of the 
relational conception of space during that period. “The word sandugo, the root word of Sanduguan, 
means brotherhood or friend in the Mangyan dialect” (“Sanduguan Festival”). Since then, Chinese 
traders have frequented Philippine shores that by 1225, the Philippine-China trade relations 
expanded to other areas such as, Palawan, Babuyan, Lingayen, and Manila (Dagdagan 32). 
 The most noteworthy tributary relations were between China and  Butuan and the Sultanate 
of Sulu, which are now both part of contemporary Mindanao. Since March 1001, Butuan’s King 
Kiling sent tributary missions, “requesting equal status with Champa.”  It was Sri Bata Shaja’s 
tributary mission in 1011 that secured that status (Scott 4).  The most significant tributary-trade 
relations was the one between the Sulu Sultanate and China. Warren (1979) notes that it was “a 
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trade which dominated so much of the economic life of Southeast Asia…Under the stimulus of the 
China trade the Sulu Sultanate experienced tremendous economic growth” (228).  The Sultanate of 
Sulu started to appear in Chinese sources during the Yuan  dynasty (1278-1368); then the Ming 
Annals describe lengthily its tributary mission in 1417; Sulu then reappeared in the Qing Annals, 
which recorded “five separate tribute-bearing missions dispatched by the Sultans..in the years 
between 1727 and 1763” (Warren 5).  
How the death of a sultan of Sulu was treated by the Yongle dynasty also reflected the  
relational conception of space during that time.  Sulu’s king Paduka Pahala died in China in 
September 1417 while on his way back from a tributary mission. Upon learning this, the Yongle 
emperor arranged a funeral fit “for a brother of the empire.” Paduka Pahala’s mausoleum still stands 
as a well-kept tourist attraction “in Dezhou [in Shandong, in a] Chinese-Muslim village, many of 
whose inhabitants trace their roots to the Sultan of Sulu.” These descendants of Paduka Pahala, who 
bear the surnames Won and An, were granted citizenship during the Qing dynasty in 1731 
(Tordesillas). 
 Throughout this period of interaction, the SCS served as an open channel of communication. 
According to Wolters (1999), the SCS is part of what he calls “the single ocean,” which consists of 
“the vast expanse of water from the coasts of eastern Africa and western Asia to the immensely long 
coastal line of the Indian subcontinental and on to China.”  In this “single ocean,” trade routes were 
kept open. Possessing a seamless unity, “the trading connections that linked the opposite ends of 
maritime Asia resemble links in a chain which would join together again even if one link were 
temporary broken.” Consequently, the single ocean  was “a vast zone of neutral water, which rulers 
inside and outside and outside Southeast Asia independently and for their own interests wanted to 
protect” (45).   
 Actually,  in writing Mare Liberum, Grotius “got his helpful cue from the Asian State 
practice of freedom of commerce and trade between various countries and peoples without let or 
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hindrance”  (Anand 442). The most evocative expression of this freedom of the seas norm among 
Asian polities was what Sultan Alauddin, King of Gowa XIV, said in 1615 to the  Dutch East India 
Company, which wanted “to rule the spice trade routes and to uphold monopoly mandated by their 
parliament.” He said: “God created earth and sea. Land was distributed among human yet ocean 
was given to all. That a journey by sea is forbidden for certain races is unheard of” (qtd. in Arsuka 
310). Corollary to this norm “was a tradition of hospitality to foreign traders,…attracted by suitable 
port facilities, fair trading practices, and protection from sporadic piracy in local waters” (Walters 
46). 
China and the Philippines and the territorial conception of space 
 The territorial conception of space in this region arose when its polities started to become 
nation-states. The Philippines started to become one, under the occupation of the Americans, in 
1898; while China began assuming that form in 1911 when the Republic of China was established. 
Because of this territorial conception of space, the world now consists of “absolute political spaces, 
of clear-cut boundaries separating polities” (Taylor 8). In this new spatial configuration, China and 
the Philippines are now discrete units in an international system, a continuation of the wave of 
“success of state-centered politics legitimating itself as national politics,” which started in Europe 
(Taylor 1). Their boundaries are now demarcated, determined by exact geographic coordinates.  
 From being the centre of tianxia, China is now just a state, with a status nominally equal to 
other states.  
The Republican government of 1912, inherited…the Da Qing Guo the 
vast Qing empire, the multinational and multicultural expanse that 
included Manchuria, Mongolia, Easter Turkestan and Tibet, among other 
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areas…[T]his space was not only redefined, as ‘Chinese’ and as the 
sacred soil of China, but also defended diplomatically…(Kirby 436-437). 
Meanwhile, the different polities in pre-nation-state Philippines no longer have their independence 
as they are now subsumed under one body politic. This unity began to be forged during centuries of 
Spanish colonisation, which began in 1521. Spain established a “centralized government,” which 
soldered the different polities in pre-colonial Philippines “into an entity.” This, however, did not 
include “places which had not been effectively governed and Christianized by the Spaniards, such 
as…the mountains of northern Luzon and the Mohammedans in Mindanao.” By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, “the Philippine nation was being impressed with its own individuality; the 
inhabitants saw themselves as a distinct group” (Pilapil 250).   
 The relationship between China and the Philippines is no longer determined by tributary 
relations nor expressed through language of kinship but by inter-state diplomatic norms.  Their 
sovereignty is absolute, exclusive, and exercised within a bounded political space. The norm has 
now become to exclude foreigners rather than consider them as part of tianxia or strangers who 
could be incorporated through kinship rituals.  
 In this new order, the SCS has been territorialised. In China, Chinese premier Li Keqiang 
referred to the seas as “blue-colored national soil” during the National People’s Congress  in early 
2014 (Cheng). Holmes (2013) views it as China’s intention to exercise “the absolute territorial 
sovereignty at sea that governments exercise within their land frontiers.” Chih (2014) notes that “it 
reveals how China’s articulations are premised upon a commonsensical and unproblematic notion 
of territory and its intersecting relationship with sovereignty and legal regimes” (345). Meanwhile, 
to assert its claims over the SCS, the Philippines unilaterally proceeded to parcelise the sea, as if it 
is land, by renaming some parts of it as the “West Philippine Sea,” which are the waters around the 
Luzon Sea, as well as the maritime areas “within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group and 
Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal” (“Naming the West Philippine Sea”). It is 
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within this context shaped by the territorial conception of political space that the rivalry between 
China and the Philippines sprang. But how did this shift in spatial thinking generate the rivalry? 
The next chapter will identify and discuss the major historical events that provoked the shift 
from a relational conception of political space to a territorial one. It will be followed by an 
unpacking of the intersubjective and institutionalised forms of ideas they engendered. Afterwards is 
an explanation of how these changes shaped the perception of China and the Philippines of 
themselves as rivals, which consequently led to their rivalrous relationship over the sea they have 
shared for the most part of their history. 
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Chapter 5 
The Path from Ideas to China-Philippines Rivalry 
This chapter will identify the major historical events which stirred the shift from a relational 
conception of space to a territorial one. This will be accompanied by a discussion of  the 
intersubjective and institutionalised forms of ideas they engendered. Afterwards is an explanation of 
how they shaped the perception of China and the Philippines of themselves as rivals, which 
consequently led to their rivalrous relationship over the sea that once served as the bridge of their 
peoples throughout most of their bilateral history. 
The shift from a relational conception of space to a territorial one is a narrative of what 
Maier (2006) once called the “fixation with social enclosures,” through which “defending rigid 
borders became a preoccupation of social and political life” (46). This preoccupation is the 
structuring logic of the SCS rivalry between China and the Philippines, whose respective claims are 
about defending their own version of SCS enclosure. China’s version is represented by the nine-
dash line (previously known as the eleven-dash line),   which was originally drawn by the 9
nationalist government of China (Republic of China) “in an official map in 1947 and publicly 
released the following year, titled the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands” (Chung 39). 
Meanwhile, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Philippines’ claim is represented by its 
parcelisation of the SCS, which it did quite recently, through Administrative Order. No. 29, series of 
2012, signed by President Benigno Aquino, entitled Naming the West Philippine Sea of the Republic 
 For the story of how the 11-dash line became a 9-dash line, see Hannah Beech, “Just Where Exactly Did 9
China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From?” Time. Time, 19 July 2016. Web. 15 February 2017.
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of the Philippines, and for other Purposes. Both China and the Philippines fiercely defend their 
respective claims over the islands, reefs, shoals, and rocks in the SCS, marshalling concepts of 
sovereignty and exclusive economic zone. Accompanying this is their desire to exclude nationals of 
each other from their respective areas of interests. 
The preoccupation of China and the Philippines in drawing boundaries and excluding the 
other from parts of the sea is the root of the rivalry. It is a product of three interrelated elements: the 
rise of the cartographic state, sovereignty becoming the right to exclude, and the territorialisation of 
the sea. These elements comprise what Diehl and Goertz call the “well-entrenched causes” of the 
“political shock” (War and Peace, 221) which dramatically changed the structure of the interaction 
between China and the Philippines from being structured around a relational conception of political 
space to a territorial one. These three well-entrenched causes are what stuck China and the 
Philippines in a territorial trap, which predisposes them in a rivalrous relationship. 
  
The Rise of the Cartographic State 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the territorial conception of space has two important 
aspects: delineated boundary and exclusive notion of sovereignty. The former is a necessary 
condition for the latter.  
 Branch (2014) foregrounds the role of the cartographic revolution in the rise of a new way 
of thinking about territory. This revolution was ushered in by the rediscovery in the fifteenth 
century in Europe of “Ptolemaic techniques — particularly the foundational idea of using celestial 
coordinates and geometric map projections” (Branch, The Cartographic State, 51).  European 
powers started applying these Ptolemaic cartographic grid techniques in the Americas. Since then, 
the world, through various colonial projects of Europeans, was neatly divided into non-overlapping 
political spaces. In early nineteenth century, political spaces with clearly demarcated boundaries 
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started to spring up when the post-Napoleonic wars treaties defined territories according to their 
boundaries (Branch, “Colonial Reflection,” 284-291).  
 In the SCS region, the cartographic state is a product of the encounters of Asian polities with 
Western powers. As Roskzko (2015) notes, “due to the colonial encounter, many Asian states saw a 
need for creating their own national geo-body through mapping and by creating an outline of the 
map as a national symbol.” Consequently, traditional conception of political space and practices  
“have to change to conform to the new geography of a country outlined by a modern map” (234). 
However, though contact and struggle with Western powers is common to both China and the 
Philippines, how their respective cartographic geo-bodies emerged and got understood followed 
different trajectories. 
 The different independent and Spanish-colonised upland and lowland polities of the 
Philippines coalesced into a national geo-body after the United States supplied the geographic 
coordinates of the group of islands they wanted from the Spanish East Indies. Originally, Article III 
of the 1898 Washington Peace Protocol between Spain and the United States only mentioned “the 
city, bay, and harbor of Manila” as the areas to be occupied by the Americans. However, during the 
negotiations of the 1898 Treaty of Paris,  the American negotiating team demanded from the 
negotiating team of the Spanish Empire all the islands and polities within the geographic 
coordinates that they arbitrarily determined. The Americans carved a line around all the group of 
islands they wanted — from Luzon to Sulu — and pressured Spain to give them up, even though 
not every polity within the perimeter of the coordinates the Americans supplied were successfully 
conquered by Spain, such as the interior of Maguindanao polity (Junker 297) and upland polities of 
Ifugao and Kalinga (Henley 170). After protesting, the Spanish negotiating team agreed after the 
Americans proposed to pay twenty million dollars and promised “to maintain in the Philippines an 
open door to the world’s commerce” and gave permission to “Spanish ships and merchandise…into 
the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as American ships and merchandise” (for the 
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exchange of communications between American and Spanish negotiators on cessation of the 
different polities of the Philippines, see A treaty of Peace, 107-211; see also Bautista).  
 The emergence of the geo-body of China as a nation-state is less abrupt than the Philippines. 
Though cartographic Ptolemaic cartographic techniques were introduced to China as early as the 
sixteenth century by Jesuit  missionary Matteo Ricci (Branch, The Cartographic State, 58), maps of 
China do not reflect clear demarcation of boundaries, defined in precise geographic coordinates. As 
Callahan (2009) notes, “instead of using mathematical surveys to clarify China’s territorial 
boundaries, they appeal to contingencies of historical geography” (153). From the maps produced 
before and after China became a republic in 1912 it can be inferred that Chinese understanding of 
unbounded space and territory (jiangyu) remains in “creative tension” with the “modern 
understanding of bounded sovereign territory (zhuquan lingtu)” (Callahan 146). The first map the 
Republic of China released in 1912 in its founding Almanac “does not assert clear boundaries 
between [China] and other sovereign states.”  This might be because the founding constitution of 
the Republic of China simply declared the territory of China to be the same as the domain of the 
Qing dynasty (Callahan 151). Nonetheless, the notion of modern version of boundary started to be 
reflected in Chinese maps after European, Japanese, and American powers pressured China to sign 
“unequal treaties limiting Chinese territory” in the nineteenth century. “These maps argued in 
national terms, using lines and different colors when depicting different countries and aiming at 
describing boundaries and territories as a way of defining particular territories considered 
inviolable” (Matten 128). 
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Sovereignty as the right to exclude  10
 When territorial sovereignty advanced in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it has been 
used “sparingly” to exclude non-nationals in the territory of the state “and only against those per-
sons who were perceived to be a threat to the kingdom” (Waldman 14). People largely enjoyed 
freedom of movement (Nafziger 815). Territorial sovereignty assumed its current form as essential-
ly the right to exclude because of legislations and jurisprudence aligning with anti-immigrant per-
suasions at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 The rise of nationalism and economic protectionism ushered in immigration policies intend-
ed to exclude non-citizens. In 1882, the United States passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, considered 
to be “an important watershed in the history of American immigration legislation. It marked the be-
ginning of a period of more than eight decades (1882-1965) in which the immigration policy of the 
United States was officially racist” (Fisher and Fisher 73). The Act was a response to anti-Chinese 
coolies protests which started in San Francisco, and it aimed to ban all Chinese labourers. In 1902, 
the Act was extended “to all American insular possessions,” which included the Philippines (Soen-
nichsen 82). 
 The validity of the Act was tested in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1899). It involved 
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese resident and worker in California. He was denied entry to the United 
States after returning from China. The Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Act and 
developed the doctrine of territorial sovereignty as essentially the right to exclude foreigners. Since 
then, “leading jurists and international law commentators” propagated this belief (Waldman 18).
 This part has been derived from a section of my bachelor’s thesis at Leiden University College. It has been 10
repurposed and developed further for this master’s thesis. See Sasot, Sass Rogando. “The Thomas van 
Beersum Affair: Who has the right to participate in the parliament of the streets?” Bachelor’s thesis. Leiden 
University College, 2014. Print.
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Territorialisation of the sea 
 The territorialisation of the sea or “maritime territorialisation” involves “the process  by 
which coastal states’ sovereignty, exclusive rights and specific jurisdictions are spatially 
implemented at sea (the creation of maritime zones, limits and boundaries)” (Bouchard 79). This 
process of extending one’s sovereignty over the sea has been going on at least as early as the 
seventeenth century. The watershed moment was the publication of the influential Selden’s Mare 
Clausum, “which maintained that the seas were indeed capable of ownership and, since the 
resources of the seas were by no means inexhaustible, a State had the right to protect its interests by 
restricting the use of certain areas.” Then in 1782 Italian jurist Galiani published an influential 
“treatise in which he suggested that three miles be taken as the breadth of uniform belts of 
sovereignty along the cost” (Alexander 563). 
 Since then, the process termed “ocean enclosure movement” (Alexander 561) further 
developed, giving birth to “two institutional devices — regimes and zones,” which “represents a 
mode of thinking about the assertion of land-based authority over areas of the ocean and activities 
at sea.” Regime pertains to “system of principles, rules, procedures, and institutions,” while zone 
refers to “an area that has been spatially defined for separate or special treatment within a 
functionally defined context of official action” (Johnston 42-44). The latest development in this 
process is the introduction of the concept of EEZ through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982). Marshalling this concept, coastal states are able to nationalise and border ocean spaces and 
extend their “national sovereignty beyond their territorial sea” (Roszko 234). 
 These three processes:  the rise of the cartographic state, sovereignty becoming essentially 
the right to exclude non-nationals, and the territorialisation of the sea were the elements of the 
territorial conception of political space, which served as the new structure of interaction between 
China and the Philippines. It is in this structure of interaction that the rivalry between these to 
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countries developed and continued to persist. How then these three worked together to spur these 
two countries into a rivalrous relationship? 
  
Ideas to Rivalry 
   
 The cartographic revolution, sovereignty as the right to exclude, and the territorialisation of 
the sea are the shared ideas that constituted the identity of China and the Philippines, which 
compelled them to be territorial.  “Territoriality,” Maier (2006) explains, “is created because 
multiple powers contest a finite global space, each seeking, as Weber emphasized, some zone of 
monopoly or exclusive control or sovereignty” (34).  Consequently, this identity shaped how they 
behave towards each other. And the SCS serves as the theatre within which they perform their 
territorial identity and the interests that such identity engenders. 
 The introduction of new cartographic ideas “changed rulers’ foundational norms and ideas 
about how politics should and could be organized, altering the conditions of possibility for political 
rule and interaction…” by enabling “new capabilities and practices and simultaneously constituted 
new goals as legitimate” (Branch, The Cartographic State, 8). The delineation of political spaces 
promoted by new mapping practices created “the imaginary of an apparently impermeable 
sovereign territorial state” (Matten 128). The mapping practices of identifying geographic 
coordinates engendered states obsessed with creating exact and linearly demarcated boundaries. In 
turn, these boundaries generated mutually exclusive political spaces, which are being sought by 
both China and the Philippines as they put forward their own ways of enclosing the SCS.  
 China’s nine-dash line and the SCS parcelisation sought by the Philippines are cut in the 
same cloth of boundary-obsessed territorialism. Corollary to the boundary-obsessed territorialism 
engendered by cartographic ideas state is the exclusive notion of sovereignty, which relies on 
determining boundaries. Once identified, sovereignty is marshalled by states to exclude non-
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members of their political communities from the areas under their control or within the zones of 
their interests. Rozko (2015) notes that “the SCS was, up until the 1990s, considered open sea (high 
sea), with its fishing grounds considered common property. This has changed as China, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, and Taiwan have taken a more assertive stance towards the SCS” (234). This 
assertive stance is enabled by an understanding of sovereignty, which has been essentialised to be 
the power of political communities to exclude non-citizens even from areas like the SCS which 
have been traditionally a common fishing grounds of its littoral states.  Now, “seizing upon the 
exclusive notion of sovereignty, state governments do no just adopt new technologies and new 
forms of knowledge but also push for modifications in the international legal regime to allow them 
to demarcate their national borders at sea” (Rozko 234). 
 In turn, these boundary-making practices and exclusionary sovereignty have been extended 
into maritime areas as the movement to territorialise the sea intensified in the twentieth century. The 
latest development in this sea enclosure movement is the UNCLOS, which “generated or 
exacerbated [the SCS] conflict by raising the stakes, failing to resolve key legal issues, and 
encouraging overlapping zone claims” (Song and Tønnesson 258). 
 As both China and the Philippines continue to see themselves as territorial states with 
sovereignty essentially interpreted as the power to exclude non-citizens within their clearly 
demarcated political spaces which include the sea, the more they will see each other as rivals who 
see their relationship as a zero-sum game. In this game, China and the Philippines mutually seek to 
exclude each other from their areas of interests in the SCS. Some may see this territorial behaviour 
as a product of human nature (see for example Ardrey); however, as Smith (1990) argues,  
territoriality is…not some innate human trait but a social construct. It can 
take different forms in different geographical and historical circumstances, 
and its specific manifestations must be contextualized. It is not sufficient to 
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see territoriality simply as a normal and necessary characteristic of human 
existence…(3).  
 This thesis has shown that the territorial claim making of China and the Philippines emerged 
as a result of a shift in the conception of political space in the SCS region. This shift from relational 
to territorial ushered in new ideas, chief of them are mapping techniques, sovereignty as the power 
to exclude non-citizens, and maritime territorialisation. Exogenous both to China and the 
Philippines, these ideas changed the traditional order in the SCS region which was structured by a 
relational conception of political space. Learning and internalising these ideas, both China and the 
Philippines are performing the imperatives of territoriality as they assert exclusive control in their 
areas of interests in the SCS. Their respective quests for exclusive control “implies inability to share 
with some others, and their exclusion by various means” (Smith 1). And it is this quest brought by a 
shift in the conception of political space that predisposes them to a rivalrous relationship. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
As the “coldblooded territorial disputes” of the littoral states of the SCS goes on, the dim 
future pundits predict advances like a wave that might soon break upon the shores of the present 
(Kaplan, “The South China Sea,” 82).  The intersecting claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia overlap with China’s U-Shaped Line, demarcating the area it 
claims in the Sea (see Chung). Since China dwarfs the other parties in terms of their capability to 
enforce their claims, Kaplan sees them as inevitably “dependent on the United States,” the power 
that can balance against China (Kaplan, “The South China Sea,” 82). And that is precisely the 
intention of  America’s “pivot to Asia” (Campbell and Andrews): a gesture reassuring to some of 
the littoral states, but deeply worrisome to some observers. The entanglement of the current 
superpower with a conflict that involves the emerging superpower, the observers warn, might 
stimulate the Thucydidean Trap to snap (see Allison, The Thucydides Trap; Coker; Rosecrance). 
 Derived by Graham Allison from Thucydides’ analysis of the proximate cause of the 
Peloponnesian War, the Thucydidean Trap posits that war is the likely outcome of the power 
transition between a declining hegemonic power and an emerging one. Provoked by fear of the 
other, the former will launch a war to secure its position or the latter will initiate it to speed up its 
ascent (Allison, Case File). American involvement in the SCS conflict might just pave the way to 
doom. This paper dealt with a trap prior to the possible Thucydidean Trap: the territorial trap. The 
territorial trap has a history. Its emergence is a consequence of a series of processes that began in 
the past that produced a shift in the structure of interaction which spawned the rivalry identity of the 
littoral polities of the SCS. And this paper traced the process of its emergence. 
 Departing from materialist understanding of the SCS conflict, this endeavour foregrounded 
the role of ideas in producing the rivalry between China and the Philippines. Guided by 
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constructivist theory of international relations fused with the rivalry approach to conflict, this 
undertaking has shown how a shift in the intersubjective and institutionalised conception of space 
generated the rivalry. Three ideas were identified as consequential: new cartographic ideas which 
promoted linearly demarcated boundaries, sovereignty as the power to exclude non-citizens, and the 
territorialisation of the sea.  
 By taking a constructivist stance, this study has questioned the givenness of the conflicting 
interests of the claimants, which has been taken for granted by writers of the conflict. Just like 
identity, these interests are fashioned by the shared ideas which also determine “the structures of 
human association” (Wendt, Social Theory 1).  
Since these shared ideas are socially constructed, they can be deconstructed, and re-
constructed in such a way that transforms the relationship of the conflicting parties to a more 
amicable one. Thus, this paper is not only a scholarly examination of the conflict, it is also a 
political intervention, offering the reflection needed to usher in that stable peace between China and 
the Philippines, and hopefully among the rest of the coastal states competing over the SCS’ bounty. 
The reflection this intervention offered has put a spotlight on how the transformation in the 
conception of political space led to the rivalry of the two countries over their shared sea. It imparted 
the story of how the institutionalisation of a historically specific idea of territory itself is a crucial 
factor in entrapping China and the Philippines into a rivalry. Hopefully, this reflection can prompt 
the re-imagination of the interaction between China and the Philippines — one that does not 
predispose them to rivalry that could erupt into enmity, which could rile them to cut each other’s 
heads off. And that re-imagination must be radical enough in order to serve as the political shock 
needed to stem the inertia of the enduring rivalry between the two countries.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 Philippines - China Interactions in the context of the SCS Conflict
Event Date
Establishment of the Republic of the Philippines June 1898
United States occupied the Philippines August 1898
Establishment of Republic of China January 1912
France occupied nine features of the Spratly Islands. Chinese government 
protested.
1930/1932
Japan took over the features France occupied 1939
Japan occupied the Philippines 1942
Philippines liberated from Japanese occupation 1945
Philippines granted full independence by the United States 1946
Republic of China placed SCS island groups under authority of Hainan Dis-
trict of Guang Dong Province May 1949
 
Chinese Legation in Manila informed Philippine government that Taiping Is-
land (Itu Aba), the largest feature in the Spratlys was occupied by a Chinese 
Naval Unit 
Some Philippine cabinet members suggested that Filipinos be encouraged to 
settle in Taiping Island in preparation of annexing the Spratly Islands. Chinese 
Legation in Manila asserted Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys. 
April 1949
PRC gets established October 1949
In a press conference, Philippine President Quirino declared the Spratly Is-
lands belonging to the Philippines
May 1950
Japan renounced all rights to the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands (Treaty of 
San Francisco) but did not name to whom they would renounce them
September 1951
International Civil Aviation Organization conference in Manila, sixteen coun-
tries represented, including: Republic of China and the Philippines. Confer-
ence adopted resolution requesting China to provide weather report and fore-
cast for the Spratly Islands
October 1955
Filipino businessman Tomas Cloma landed in some features of the Spratly Is-
lands and asserted ownereship, calling them “Freedomland” (Kalayaan Is-
lands)
March 1956
Tomas Cloma wrote a letter to Philippine Vice President Carlos P. Garcia, ask-
ing the Philippine government to support his claim.
May 1956
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Through a letter, Tomas Cloma informed Chinese Embassy of his claim.  PRC 
and the Republic of China-Taiwan protested.
May 1956
Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Philippine Ambas-
sador in Taipei to talk about the Spratly Islands. The Ambassador said Philip-
pines had no desire to foment tension in the area. 
June 1956
Chinese nationalists intercepted and disarmed a Filipino fishing boat that 
sailed near the Spratly Islands
October 1956
Philippine forces attempted to land on Taiping Island, but was driven away by 
troops of the Republic of China
1971
Philippines sent a communique to Republic of China, after the latter allegedly 
fired at a fishing boat carrying Congressman Ramon Mitra that veered near 
Taiping Island. Philippines declared Chinese occupation of of the Island a 
“serious threat to national security.”  
 
Philippine President Marcos appropriated Cloma’s claims. Philippines pro-
claimed ownership of 53 islands. 
Republic of China sent a diplomatic protest; asserted sovereignty over the is-
lands. People’s Republic of China echoed the protests.
July 1971
Philippines officially placed Kalayaan Islands under the administration of its 
westernmost island of Palawan. Tomas Cloma made chairman. April 1972
Philippines built Rancudo Airfield in Thitu Island 1975
Philippine established diplomatic relations with PRC. Philippines and PRC 
issued Joint Communique agreeing to settle disputes by peaceful means.
1975
Philippines formally annexed Kalayaan Island Group as part of Philippine ter-
ritory, turned it into a district of Palawan,  
 
Philippines declared Kalayaan Island Group as within the EEZ of the Philip-
pines
June 1978
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, encouraging parties to re-
solve the disputes through peaceful means.
July 1992
Filipino fishermen spotted stilts structures of the Chinese in Mischief Reef. 
Philippines sent diplomatic protest. 
January 1995
Through the statement of Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Philippines 
formally claimed the Scarborough Shoal as part of Philippine territory
1997
Philippine navy run aground a Philippine vessel in Second Thomas Shoal. 
People’s Republic of China protested.
May 1999
Philippines and PRC issued Joint Statement between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philip-
pines on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century
May 2000
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State oil corporations of the Philippines, PRC, and Vietnam entered into a tri-
partite agreement called the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking to explore cer-
tain areas in the South China Sea 
March 2005
Philippines and PRC held a bilateral consultation on the SCS issue, among 
other matters. Philippines recommended areas to be classified as disputed and 
non-disputed areas; and for the claimant States to meet under the aegis of 
ASEAN. China rejected, and suggested bilateral consultation and establish-
ment of a Philippine-China maritime consultation mechanism. Philippines re-
jected China’s offer. 
January 2012
Philippine coastguards tried to arrest Chinese fishermen from harvesting 
corals, giant clams, and even live sharks in Scarborough Shoal. Chinese sur-
veillance ships arrived to prevent the arrest. Philippines responded by sending 
its biggest warship. A naval stand off ensued.
April 2012
Philippines unilaterally filed an arbitration case against PRC. PRC repeatedly 
expressed its intention not to honour the arbitral court.
January 2013
Arbitration decision got released. Philippines most of its claims; PRC’s histor-
ical claim based on the 9-dash line declared incompatible with UNCLOS.
July 2016
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pursued a policy of rapprochement, and 
visited China. The Philippines and China issued a joint statement, which de-
clares, among other things, that “contentious issues [on the South China Sea] 
are not the sum total of the Philippines-China bilateral relationship.”
October 2016
